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Book Reviews
TAXABI

INCOM.

By Roswell Magill. New York. The

Ronald Press Company 1936. Pp. ix, 437.
To most of us income taxes mean an annual headache
and a period of horror. They give us some of the few moments in life when we feel richer than we are and wish we
weren't.
This may be likened to the worm's eye view of the income tax and is the antithesis of the panorama spread before
us by Mr. Magill's excellent book.
Few people, if any, are as well fitted by training and
aptitude as Mr. Magill to bring order out of the seeming
maze of our income tax laws. Both as a practicing lawyer
and as a professor of law he has been for years one of the
leading analysts and expositors of our tax laws and especially of the income tax. In addition, he has occupied such
important government positions as Adviser to the Tax
Commission of Porto Rico, Chief Attorney of the U. S.
Treasury Department, and Assistant to the Secretary of
the Treasury on taxation, and is now Undersecretary of the
Treasury.
In his present book, therefore, Mr. Magill blends the
agility of a practicing lawyer whose problem is to escape
paying, the detachment of a professor, and the grasping
scrutiny of a government official whose job is to produce the
cash. He also brings to the task a brilliant and inquiring
mind that is not satisfied to know what the law says and
does but must also know why.
One theory of modern education is to let the pupil pick
the subject that most interests him and, by allowing concentration on this, to encourage the absorption of other
fields of knowledge which, if offered in separate bottles,
might repel him. A student interested in geography is
bound to acquire a knowledge of mathematics, history, science, etc. in order to satisfy his enthusiasm for geography.
With many people more useful and intelligently arranged
knowledge will be acquired in this way than by repeated
dosings of labelled learning.
One is reminded of this theory in reading Taxable Income. As implied by its title the main theme of the book
is the discovery and analysis of what constitutes "taxable
income" under the various Revenue Acts and the Sixteenth
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Amendment. Mr. Magill first whets the desire of answering this and then when enthusiasm is aroused uses it as a
lens through which to examine the entire field.
The advantages of such an approach are obvious. There
is probably no branch of the law in which it is so easy to fail
to see the forest for the trees. Not only does the inquirer
soon become lost in a maze of exceedingly complicated statutes, regulations and rules, but the very guideposts that
are employed by lawyers accentuate the difficulty. By
means of voluminous services one can usually find the section, paragraph or decision which most nearly fits his
factual situation, but it is a burrowing process and even
when the particular tree is found its position in the forest
is frequently lost.
As a consequence of Mr. Magill's method, furthermore,
there is a refreshing minimum of reference to the law by
chapter and verse. To one accustomed to the usual tax
literature it scarcely seems like a book on taxation and has
a sacrilegious feel about it similar to that of a Bible from
which some profane person had pruned all the genealogical
references. It has a life and vigor which tax treatises are
not supposed to have. In fact, if a thorough work on anything as naturally ponderous as taxation can be made interesting to the normal reader, this is it.
It should be pointed out in this respect that Mr. Magill
is no shrinking violet. He does not hesitate to pass judgment on the decisions of the Supreme Court in a most
parental manner. On the other hand this is not overdone,
and one of the most refreshing aspects of the book is its
somewhat dogmatic character.
Like Gaul, Taxable Income is divided into three parts.
In the first, one learns what an enormous word "income"
i! and also learns more fully to appreciate Humpty
Dumpty's comforting rule that a word means "what I
choose it to mean". As usual the judges are the masters
-the word "income" is weaned away from the definition
of the economists and acquires new and more practical
characteristics in the hands of the Supreme Court.
In part two are catalogued and analyzed the characteristics of income, that is to say the "benefits" which are
taxable as income, and in part three are discussed limitations dependent upon the source from which things sought
to be taxed as income are derived. Finally there is a short
and delightful summary in which are pointed up the bolder
features of the entire concept.
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Don't try Taxable Income in the drowsy hours after
lunch, but if you enjoy touring difficult terrain under the
guidance of a stimulating and incisive mind, don't fail to
try it.

-H. H.
MARYLAND ANNOTATIONS
TUTE 'S

RESTATEMENT

WALKER LEWIS.*

TO THE AMERICAN

OF THE LAW

OF

LAW INSTI-

CONFLICT OF

LAWS.

Prepared by G. Kenneth Reiblich, under the auspices of the
Maryland State and Baltimore City Bar Associations.
Published by the American Law Institute Publishers, St.
Paul, Minn., 1937, pp. 214.
When, a year ago, it was suggested that the then newly
organized Maryland Law Review might carry reviews of
the Maryland Annotations to the Restatements promulgated
by the American Law Institute as they appeared, a facetious colleague of the present reviewer's remarked that it
would be equally appropriate to review the telephone directory or a mail order catalogue. But it was soon demonstrated that these local annotations provide sufficient
material for a reviewer's pen to dissect. The first number
of the REvEW carried a review' of the earlier published
Maryland Annotations to the Restatement of Agency, which
compilation, like the one now under discussion, was prepared by a member of the Law School faculty under Bar
Association auspices. In this earlier review a member of
the local bar, himself active both in the work of the American Law Institute nationally and in the Maryland annotation work, took occasion to describe the nature of the Institute, the scope of its work, and the significance of the
local annotations.
It is thus not necessary so soon to repeat the description
of what the Restatements are and why they were promulgated. Suffice it to say that the Restatement of Conflict of
Laws was prepared by Professor Joseph H. Beale of the
Harvard Law School as Reporter and, naturally, reflects
the decided views of that pre-eminent authority in the field.
Publication of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws has
brought to a head the growing controversy over the general
desirability of "restating" the law at all. A respectably
large group of thinkers on matters legal hold to the view
that the whole idea of restating the law is mistaken because
1

Of the Baltimore City bar.
Howard, review of Casner, Maryland Annotations to the American Law

Institute's Restatement of the Law of Agency (1936) 1 Md. L. Rev. 99.
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it will tend unnecessarily to "straight-jacket" the law.2
Then there are those who believe that the Conflict of Laws
Restatement's choice of doctrine too often reflects the
Reporter's own views rather than either the majority rule
or that which is the most desirable one. Considerable controversy has arisen, for instance, over one section' wherein
the Restatement adopts the view of the Reporter' rather
than that of the Supreme Court of the United States5 on a
point where that Court has the final and only say in the
matter.
But it is not proposed to go further into this. To review
a book devoted to local annotations of a general Restatement is to accept, for the sake of the argument at least, the
propriety of attempting and the validity of the execution
of the general project which is annotated. Regardless of
what one thinks about the validity of the general idea of
Restatements, it cannot be denied that they have had the
beneficent influence of stimulating the production of these
orderly summaries of local materials on topics which, otherwise, would not have been so soon thus covered.
Professor Reiblich (aided by a group of student and
recent graduate research assistants) prepared these annotations under the auspices (financial and otherwise) of the
Maryland State and Baltimore City Bar Associations. In
making possible the production of such local annotations,
the co-operating groups have made a double contribution
to the legal scene. They have, in the first place, provided
themselves and their fellow lawyers with a means of access
to local materials which will facilitate the task of advising
clients and arguing cases. But they have, further, made a
contribution the significance of which should not be underestimated. This concerns the utility of the annotations in
law teaching. Not only has the task of preparing them
made it possible for the group of research assistants to gain
valuable experience in legal research (akin to that afforded
to student editors on the REvimw) but the finished product
provides for future generations of students an efficient
2 A recent series of articles taking part in the controversy includes:
Lorenzen and Heilman, The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws (1935)
83 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 555; Goodrich, Institute Bards and Yale Reviewers
(1936) 84 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 449; Arnold, Institute Priests and Yale Observers: A reply to Dean Goodrich (1936) 84 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 811.
3 Sec. 113.
' In connection with this see McClintock, Fault as an Element of Divorce
Jurisdiction (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 564, and Bingham, The American Law
Institute vs. The Supreme Court: In the matter of Haddock v. Haddock
(1936)
21 Corn. L. J. 393.
5
Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 50 L. Ed. 867, 26 S. Ct. 525 (196).
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means of access to the Maryland materials. Such publications make it possible effectually to present local materials
with a minimum of trouble. Thus there is easily left time
for the thorough indoctrination in the general common law
of the various subjects which is necessary if the graduate
lawyer is to have more than a provincial viewpoint.
The reviewer can testify both to the pedagogical utility
and the intrinsic merit of Professor Reiblich's compilation
inasmuch as he was permitted access to the manuscript of
these annotations as an aid in teaching the course temporarily during the annotator's recent leave of absence from
the Law School. The annotations proved invaluable in
presenting the local materials.
That the Bar Associations have made such annotations
possible represents a commendable contribution which the
leaders of the bar have made to the cause of legal education
and one which would justify the project even if there were
disregarded the equally significant fact that such annotations are extremely useful in the practice. Co-operation
between the Bar Associations and the Law School in this
manner accomplishes an effectual liaison between the practice of law and the training of neophytes-an end more than
ever desirable of being attained now that the growing complexity of legal materials has forced legal education hito
the hands of specialists. A similarly appropriate contact
has been achieved through the co-operation of the Associations and the Law School in the publication of the REVIEW,
a contact which it is hoped will prove valuable both to the
Bar and to the School.
Examination of Professor Reiblich's finished product
shows how completely he has executed his task. Whenever
a Maryland case or a statute has dealt with a proposition
covered by the Restatement, it is appropriately listed. But
he did not stop with a mere counting of noses pro and con.
On points where there was no square ruling of our Court be
sought out analogies from or hints given in cases or statutes
which might, conceivably, be used as bearing on the point
annotated.
Thus he points out 6 that there is no Maryland case deciding whether or not to exercise the option allowed by the
Haddock7 case to recognize all divorces granted at the
6Sec. 113, pp. 64-5.

' Supra note 5. It should be remembered that Sec. 113 of the Restatement takes a different view of the situation from the rule of the Haddock
case. See supra note 4. Mr. Reiblich's suggestion thus implies that Maryland would recognize certain foreign divorces in situations where the Restatement rule would not.
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domicil of only one of the spouses. But he suggests that
the Maryland courts should probably do so inasmuch as
they themselves will grant a divorce when only one of the
spouses is domiciled locally. Then, again, in handling the
topic of territorial jurisdiction to annul marriages, it is
pointed out 8 that the Court of Appeals has never yet
squarely ruled what factors are necessary to confer such
jurisdiction although it has, in given cases, considered on
the merits cases for annulment where at least one spouse
was domiciled in Maryland although the marriage was contracted elsewhere, or where, conversely, the marriage was
performed in Maryland but neither spouse was here domiciled. From this his conclusion is that Maryland could
possibly entertain annulment suits either on the basis of
domicil or that of place of marriage, and even on the basis
of personal jurisdiction. To do this would go farther than
the Restatement rule which, in requiring the same basis as
for jurisdiction to divorce, calls for the domicile of at least
one party.
These indirect methods of working out the Maryland
rule were rendered inevitable by the paucity of the local
materials on some points. They also attest the thoroughness of the research which underlay the annotation and the
care used in handling the materials. They give one confidence in the completeness of the execution of the project.
This is further bolstered by the fact that the annotator
took occasion to make careful analyses of local cases which
seemed to reach undesirable or aberrant results. There is
a pointed treatment of the problem of local suits for foreign
wrongful deaths,' a topic recently noted in this REvIEw,1
and also recently subjected to statutory reform."' In treating of the Corder 2 and Elfont 8 cases he points out 4 that in
each case the Court of Appeals refused an opportunity to
make a square ruling on the matter of territorial jurisdiction to annul marriages, in the one instance by confusing
the plea to the jurisdiction with the matter of equitable
jurisdiction to annul generally, and in the other by ruling
that the objection had been raised too late.
Sec. 115, pp. 65-7.
Secs. 391, 392, pp. 154-6.
Note, Action in Maryland for Wrongful Death Caused and Occurring
Elsewhere (1937) 1 Md. L. Rev. 162.
11
Acts, 1937, Ch. 495.
"Corder v. Corder, 141 Md. 114, 117 At. 119 (1922).
MElfont v. Elfont, 161 Md. 458, 157 AtI. 741 (1932).
2, p. 66.
10
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The readers should share Mr. Reiblich's expressed
gratitude to the New York annotators for granting their
permission to use their collection of the United States
Supreme Court materials which are applicable. Thus unnecessary duplication of effort was avoided and at the same
time these highly relevant materials were presented."
Conflict of Laws is now so largely tending to become a
branch of Constitutional Law that decisions of the Supreme
Court are of the highest importance in a local annotation.
Cases from the Supreme Court are as much local law as
those from our own Court of Appeals and they were, quite
appropriately, included.
With the outline already provided by the Restatement,
and because of the disjointed text form involved in annotation matter, little opportunity was given to display traits of
organization and style. On the other hand the work does
demonstrate qualities which may be involved in an annotation, viz., sound use of legal logic in analyzing the materials,
accurate classification, and, through it all, an obviously
very thorough survey of all applicable authorities.
-JOHN
1

S. STRAHOR1, 'J

It might have been well to have added a case from the Supreme Court
which is of local interest. Stewart v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 168 U. S. 445, 42
L. Ed. 537, 18 S. Ct. 105 (1897) would have been relevant in connection
with Davis v. Ruzicka, 183 AtI. 569 (Md. 1936), treated at Sections 391,
392, pp. 154-6. As mentioned in the casenote cited supra note 10, 1 Md. L.
Rev. 162, 163, Davis v. Ruzicka held that the wrongful death statutes of
Maryland and the District of Columbia were too dissimilar to permit an
action in Maryland for a death occurring in the District. In the Stewart
case, on the other hand, the Supreme Court, while adhering to the doctrine
of similarity, held that the respective statutes were sufficiently similar to
permit an action in the converse case of death in Maryland and suit in the
District. The Stewart case was cited under a neighboring section (See.
395) but without reference to the point mentioned herein.
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. Faculty
Editor of the Review.

